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Abstract
This article is in line with the United Nations attempts to approach human
development in wider terms than per capita GDP, and in line with an ever lively
debate on the historical standard of living and on the role of inequality in
development. We focus on three Mercosur countries (Argentina, Brazil and
Uruguay) and we view them in comparison with four core countries (France,
Germany, USA and UK) along the 20th Century. The paper makes different
attempts to construct diverse indices and to change the weights of their
different components in order to better explain human development in different
periods. A contribution of the paper, so long limited to Uruguay and the USA, is
to adjust the historical human development index by inequality measures for all
of its components. The results show that Argentine started to diverge, even in
human development, at early stages of the 20th Century; that Uruguay
diverged from the mid-century and that Brazil continued to tighten the gap up
to 1980, diverging afterwards without being able to come close to the levels of
the core countries. Total inequality in Uruguay and USA showed similar levels
and trends: it decreased until the 1950s, and increased afterwards to similar
levels. While inequality affects human development within both countries, it
doesn’t help to understand the differences between them, due to the mentioned
similarity of the Gini-coefficients.
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Human Development and Inequality:
the Mercosur Countries in a comparative historical perspective
1. Introduction
Since the United Nations introduced the concept of human development and
started to work with the Human Development Index (HDI), a lively debate on
different measures and variables has been taking place. Moreover, this debate was
expanded to the field of economic history, in search for what we know as the
Historical Human Development Index.
The aim of this article is to analyze the performance, in terms of human
development, of three Mercosur countries (Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay) in
relation to four core countries (France, Germany, UK and USA) during the 20th
Century.
In doing that, we cannot avoid to discuss the available human development
series and some methodological aspects, trying to improve those we consider not to
be convincing.
As the HDI does, we will mainly rely on per capita income, education and life
expectancy series. Nevertheless, we will introduce many changes to the estimates.
Per capita GDP will not be transformed into logarithms. With respect to education,
we will not only consider literacy rates, as historical estimates have done until now,
but we will consider school enrolment as well; moreover, we will explore the results
of changing the weight given to the different components of education in order to
better approach relative performance in different periods. With respect to life
expectancy, no innovations are introduced.
The main innovation of this paper, however, is to take into consideration how
inequality affects human development. Assuming that overall welfare is higher if
inequality is lower, we will estimate inequality in the distribution of income, years
of life, and education, and construct an Historical Human Development Index
adjusted by inequality trends, which we will call, in line with Hicks (1997), an
Inequality-Adjusted Historical Human Development Index (IAHHDI). Because of
data constrains, this latter attempt will only be done for Uruguay and the USA.
The results obtained are later discussed. The basic idea is that human
development is the result of innovations in the production of goods and services, in
the preservation of life and in educating the population. Those achievements may be
the result of different and complementary forces: the capacity to produce
knowledge, the capacity of learning by doing and the capacity to exploit
technological spill-overs from more advances countries.
Our results are to a high degree preliminary and our discussion still is at an
explorative level.
2. Background
Economic historians have been working hard on the reconstruction of historical
GDP series, on the basis on which the pace of economic growth and its fluctuations
could be discussed. If adequately purchasing-power adjusted, these series are also an
important way in which levels of per capita income can be compared and the
underlying determinants discussed. The efforts made by hundreds of scholars have
yielded important results, as shown by the non-exhaustive, non-undisputable but
impressive compendia published with short intervals by Angus Maddison (1995,
2000 and 2003).
Many criticisms have been directed towards the use of per capita GDP as a
measure of welfare. Besides its technical shortcomings (the coverage of the informal
sector, the lack of market prices for non-market production, the lack of
consideration of the quality and welfare implications of the goods and services
produced, and more), the assumption of an equal distribution of income among
people with different social backgrounds and needs is specially criticized by Sen.
The doctrinal base for his theory was the concept of human capability, as the ability
of human beings to live lives they have reasons to value and to enhance their
substantive choices (Sen, 1997).
Sen’s approach demands, for empirical work, varied and hardly available
information, especially on an historical dimension. Thus, the whole approach has
been finally constrained to the construction, since 1990, of the Human Development
Index, in which the per capita GDP, as a proxy for the standard of living, has been
complemented by life expectancy and education, as proxies for other aspects of the
quality of life, probably not reflected by the per capita GDP. The HDI is
complemented by a wide variety of indicators tackling many different issues, as
gender, knowledge, race and age gaps. The varying quality and availability of these
sources of information make them hardly fruitful for comparative long-run studies,
as the one we aim to perform here.
In recent years, economic historical research has tried to extend the work on
historical national accounts to the field of the historical human development.
For the Latin American countries the first important contribution was made by
Astorga & FitzGerald (1998) and the Oxford Latin America Data Base (OXLAD).
First published as an appendix to Thorp (1998) it was later upgraded in Astorga,
Bergès & FitzGerald (2004). The index combines GDP, literacy rates and life
expectancy into a so-called Historical Living Standard Index for 6 Latin American
countries during the 20th Century, and for 13 Latin American countries since the
1950s. The Index was also expressed in relation to the achievements of the USA.
Their index was as in (1).
(1)
where yi is per capita income in 1970 international dollars of country (i), lifei is life
expectancy at birth in country (i), and liti is the literacy rate in country (i).
Their two main conclusions were:
1. “…the main sub-period of development in Latin America during the
twentieth century occurred between 1940 and 1980 when there was an
unprecedented surge in economic growth and social improvement. That
this coincided with the so-called ‘import substitution’ process is not
surprising insofar as public investment and state-led basic education and
health initiatives were associated with the rise in growth rates and the
improvement in health, despite the inefficiencies and distortions
generated by forced industrialisation…It seems clear that this period saw
the greatest structural change in the Latin American economy, and was
marked by sustained and relatively stable growth and social
improvement. In stark contrast, the periods from 1900 to 1940 and from
1980 to 2000 saw lower economic growth and far more instability.”
(Astorga, Bergès & FitsGerald, 2004:24).
2. “…social convergence occurred in the absence of economic
convergence…these patterns of growth and convergence raise some
interesting questions regarding the relationship between economic
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growth and social progress, and suggest that the more simplistic
endogenous growth models may need some rethinking.” (Astorga,
Bergès & FitsGerald, 2004:24).
Both conclusions are extremely important. The second one reinforces the idea
that welfare cannot be approached by per capita GDP alone and that the evolution of
the length and quality of life may have other determinants as well. The first one has
great implications for the discussion of the Latin American performance in relation
to policy making. While the dominant approach during the 1970s-1990s pointed
towards import-substituting policies and state-led growth as the origin of Latin
American backwardness, these results seem to show a different picture, in which the
late 20th Century, dominated by structural reforms and liberalization, appears as
decades of relative stagnation.
Camou & Maubrigades (2005) improved Astorga & FitzGerald (1998) as they
not only considered literacy rates in their approach to education, but also took into
consideration school enrolment, following Bértola & Bertoni (1998). This attempt
was limited to the case of Uruguay. It also incorporated updated per capita GDP and
life-expectancy estimates, as well as some changes in the parameters according to
earlier versions of Prados (2007), which we will consider next.
A recent and important contribution to Latin American historical human
development was performed by Leandro Prados, even if not yet published (Prados
2007). He constructed a database for 1870-2000, including the available Latin
American countries and the OECD countries. He mainly relies on the OXLAD data
base for Latin America (meaning, among other things, that education is solely
approached through literacy rates) and on his own database and own purchasing-
parity estimates for per capita GDP figures. Besides advancing a very interesting
discussion of the state of the art, Prados innovates in several technical aspects of the
construction of the historical human development index:
- a convex achievement function is used to estimate the non-income
variables, implying that an increase in the standard of living of a
country at a higher level implies a greater achievement than had it
been the case if it took place at a lower level;
- the maximum and minimum values of life-expectancy are adjusted to
more realistic levels: 80 and 20 years, respectively;
- a geometric average is used: “a geometric average of the index’s
components has the advantage of reducing their substitutability
significantly, somehow avoiding that an improvement in one attribute
may offset a worsening in another, with a resulting neutral aggregate
effect on the HDI” (Prados 2007).
- It is remarkable that in spite of using a convex achievement function
for the non-income variables, the contrary transformation is done in
relation to income, so that a marginal welfare unit demands
increasing growth in per capita income.
Prados’ index can be summarized as in equation (2).
(2)
Prados’ conclusions are to a high extent similar to those obtained by Astorga,
Bergès & FitzGerald:
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- Income inequality (per capita GDP) between the OECD countries
and Latin America increased particularly in the last decades of the
20th Century (within country inequality is not considered).
- The gap in human development between Latin America and the
OECD countries shrank especially in the central decades of the 20th
Century. Even if it continued to decrease afterwards, it did at a much
slower rate and the distance still showed to be huge. (Prados 2007).
In other words, Leandro Prados’ results reinforce those obtained by Astorga,
Bergés and FitzGerald, as well as the comments already made in relation to them.
3. The construction of an Inequality-Adjusted Historical Human Development
Index (IAHHDI)
In this section we will explain how we construct our index and why. We will
rely on the three basic components of the Human Development Index (life
expectancy, education and income), but we will introduce changes in the variables
and in the weights of the components. We will use a geometric average of the
components following Prados (2007) and we will introduce an inequality
adjustment.
Life expectancy
With respect to life expectancy we will follow Prados (2007) in the sense that
the maximum and minimum values will be 80 and 20, respectively, and in the sense
that we will use a convex achievement function. The basic idea is that “an increase
in the standard of living of a country at a higher level implies a greater achievement
than had it been the case if it took place at a lower level”.
Education
The education component of the HDI is based on literacy rates (2/3) and school
enrolment (1/3). This was also the criteria followed by Camou & Maubrigades
(2005).
As different from Prados, we will not use a convex achievement function as in
the case of life expectancy. As Prados worked with literacy rates alone, his aim was
to counteract the fact that differences between countries tended to disappear as the
100% ceiling was approached. As different from life expectancy, however, in the
case of education it is difficult to argue that marginal achievements are increasing at
higher levels of coverage. Almost the contrary: once almost all the population is
literate the existing infrastructure should make it easier to educate new generations.
Here we are facing a different problem: the variable itself is not an adequate proxy
for the level of education of the population. Once almost all the population is
literate, it seems inconvenient that literacy rates answer for two thirds of the
education basket (if not 100% as in Prados 2007). Our strategy will be to raise the
ceiling itself, through a different education basket, in which secondary and tertiary
education weights are higher. We will compare the results obtained using different
baskets. It will be argued that different baskets may be used to understand different
periods and for the purpose of comparison at different levels of development.
The baskets to be used are as in Table 1.
Table 1. The Education Index: different baskets.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
% % %
Literacy 0.67 0.00 0.00
Enrolment 0.33 1.00 1.00
Coefficients for different education levels
Primary 1.0 1.0 0.0
Secondary 1.4 1.4 1.0
Tertiary 2.0 2.0 1.4
TOT 4.4 4.4 2.4
Weights: Model 1, UN (2006); others, own assumptions.
Coefficients: Model 1, Goldin (1998);
others, own assumptions mantaining the proportion between levels.
Per capita GDP.
The UN’s Human Development Index transforms per capita GDP into
logarithms. As stated in the Human Development report 2006:
“In the HDI income serves as a surrogate for all the dimensions of human
development not reflected in a long and healthy life and in knowledge. Income is
adjusted because achieving a respectable level of human development does not
require unlimited income.” (UN, 2006: 394).
The concept “respectable level of human development” looks somewhat fuzzy
and gives the idea of proximity with the approach that focuses on the satisfaction of
basic needs. However, it seems to be a difficult task to define a ceiling for what a
respectable level is and, even more, for what human development is. However, the
logarithm of the per capita GDP differs from the basic-needs approach, as the index
continues to increase with rising income, even if decreasing marginally.
Nevertheless, the transformation into logarithms is somewhat arbitrary and has
important implicantions. As was mentioned, Astorga & FitzGerald didn’t make this
transformation in their 1998 paper, but they did so in the Astorga, Bergés &
FitzGerald (2004). The argument is not convincing:
“The use of the marginal utility notion to scale per capita income cannot be
anything other than arbitrary, although no more so than not scaling per capita
income at all.” Astorga, Bergès & FitzGerald (2004:11).
However, a clearly controversial result is implied: the differences in the levels of
per capita income between countries are reduced. Besides, and following Prados’
point of view with reference to life expectancy, the paradox is that increasing human
development should demand an increasing marginal effort, in terms of per capita
GDP. Accordingly, it should lead us to a new transformation of the series using a
convex achievement function in order to capture this increasing marginal effort.
One argument not always present in the literature, but often mentioned by
people working in the field, is that while per capita GDP may always continue to
increase, life expectancy and education do not: they have a maximum level to be
achieved. The counter argument is: this is the reason why the convex achievement
function is used in the case of life expectancy, and this is the reason why it is
necessary to change the education basket. As it will be shown, the ceiling of the
more ambitious education basket is far from being reached by any country. Per
capita GDP has a ceiling too: 40.000 1990 PPP-dollars.
In short: we decide not to transform the per capita GDP series into logarithms,
but to work with the original series.
A geometric average
Following Prados (2007) we will also estimate a geometric average. The idea is
that there is no perfect substitution between the different components of the index.
The geometric average favours an even movement of all the components.
Our index is shown in equation (3).
(3)
Equity
Early in the history of the HDI some attempts were made to take inequality into
consideration. The basic idea could be expressed in a marginalist way: if income
was unequally distributed, the above-average income of the rich should yield less
welfare than the welfare loss of a similar below-average income of the poor. Other
arguments can also be used in order to consider that at a certain level of total GDP,
welfare is higher if equally distributed, than otherwise. Values, the existence of
positive externalities and the absence of negative externalities may be some of them.
The 1993 Human Development Report made an important attempt to include
distributional, inter-individual inequalities into the index. yi, as in equation (3), was
transformed into yi*(1-G), where G is for the Gini-coefficient. The underlying idea
was that life expectancy and education were naturally much less unequally
distributed than income (HDR 1993: 101).
Hicks made a strong case for the existence of significant inter-individual
inequality also in life expectancy and education: “…years of schooling does vary –
from 0 to 20… Life spans actually lived do indeed vary, from less than one year to
over 100 years” (Hicks, 1997: 1287). Accordingly, he made estimates of what he
labelled the Inequality-Adjusted Human Development Index for some third world
countries with data from 1995, based on the UN HDI.1 However, as different from
UNDP (1993), he multiplied the whole numerator of each component of the index
by 1 minus the specific Gini-coefficient. His results showed that the Gini-
coefficients for education and age were above 30% in the clear majority of the
cases, and even higher than income inequality in some countries (Bangladesh, Sri
Lanka) (Hicks 1997, table 1, p. 1290).
We will adjust the HHDI by a geometric average of the Gini-coefficients for
income, life expectancy and education, as in equation (4),
(4)
where IAHi is for the Inequality-Adjusted Historical Human Development Index,
and G is for the mentioned geometric average of the three Gini-coefficients. The
same results are obtained if the whole numerator of each component of the Gini is
multiplied by 1-G.
In the case of life-expectancy, similar Gini estimates were performed by
Shkolnikov, V. M., E. E. Andreev & A. Z. Begun (2003).
The Gini-coefficients for income will be taken from other sources, while those
for the distribution of age and education are our own estimates. In the case of
1 The data on education was from 1985, taken from Ahuja, V. & Filmer, D (1995) and was classed by “no
education”, “some primary education”, “completed primary education”, “some secondary education”,
“completed secondary education“ and “some higher education”.
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education we construct a series of the stock of knowledge of different sectors of the
population above 20 years, classified in 5 groups: illiterates, people who went to
primary school, people who went to secondary school, people who studied at the
university and professionals. The coefficients applied to the population of these
different levels of education were: 1.0, 2.0, 2.8, 4.0, and 5.4, respectively. These
coefficients follow the same proportions as in Table 1, but take illiterates as the
basic unit.
The total EHHDI is as in equation (5).
(5)
4. The data
Per capita GDP.
Per capita GDP figures had to be expressed in purchasing power parity, in order
to make them comparable. The sources are Maddison (2003) and Bértola & Porcile
(2000).
Life expectancy and life tables
The data on life expectancy is taken from OXLAD and Prados de la Escosura
(2007). In order to estimate the distribution of life, life tables of Uruguay
(Migliónico 2001) and the USA (National Vital Statistics Reports 2006) were used.
Education and distribution of education
The data on school enrolment is taken from Bértola & Bertoni (1999) and
updated with data from UNESCO.
The data on literacy rates is taken from the OXLAD (Latin America and the
USA, and from Prados de la Escosura (2007) (France, Germany and UK).
On the basis of this data base the distribution of education was estimated.
Income inequality
The Gini-coefficient of Uruguay was taken from Bértola (2005) while that of the
USA is based on Lindert (2000) and the UNU/WIDER World Income Inequality
Database V 2.0b (2007).
5. Interpreting the results
In this section we will present the relative performance of the three Latin
American countries in relation to the four core countries in terms of the HHDI,
trying to stylize the main trends and to give a preliminary interpretation. We will
also discuss the Uruguay-USA comparison with respect to the IAHHDI.
Even if the paper is primarily focused on the construction of the index and the
evaluation of the results, thus being of a predominantly empirical character, we will
shortly present a simplified theoretical framework which will help us to present and
primarily discuss the outcome.
A theoretical framework
Bértola and Porcile (2006) and Verspagen (1993) are focused on the discussion
of international differences in per capita GDP levels and growth. The former is an
attempt to characterize different convergence and divergence regimes between
Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and the four core countries considered in the present
chapter. These regimes are the result of the interaction between supply and demand
forces, as well as different policy measures, which finally affect the income
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elasticity of demand for exports and imports and the degree of openness of the
different economies.
Here, we will make an attempt to expand the application of this theoretical
framework to encompass the other components of the HHDI.
If we assume that per capita growth finally depends on technical change and
innovation, we can go on and identify the main sources for technical change as: (i)
those arising from the science and technology efforts of a country proxied by the
production of codified knowledge and expressed by the investment in R&D; (ii)
those arising from the productive structure and its learning of tacit knowledge by
doing and by the technical change induced by demand, proxied both by means of the
productive structure in relation to demand growth and technical change; (iii)
technological spill-overs from advanced to laggard countries, which in turn rely on
the size of the gap and the domestic capabilities of the laggard countries (Verspagen
1993).
These forces may be present at the GDP level, but also with reference to life
expectancy and education. With respect to life expectancy: (i) research and
development in the sciences of life and in health and nutrition technologies, play a
decisive role in the eradication of some mortality sources and the production of a
healthy and long-lasting life; (ii) the existence of private or public enterprises and
institutions linked to the “production” of health, proxied by the share of these
branches in GDP and by health and social expenditures in total expenditures, may
tell us about the learning by doing capacity of the population to improve life
expectancy; (iii) the existence of a technological gap may be a source for
improvements in life expectancy, given the fact that there exist either international
or domestic institutions and organizations willing and being able to make catching
up to take place.
Education can be approached in a similar way. Its achievements depend on the
R&D activities related to educational issues, on the learning by doing by the existent
educational institutions, and the international transfers of knowledge and education
technologies developed elsewhere. Spill-overs depend, in turn, on domestic
capabilities. As different from life expectancy, which is a proxy for an output (years
of life expected to live by the population), in the case of education our data is not
able to catch any qualitative result, neither other forms of education than the formal
primary, secondary and tertiary. Learning in different productive activities and
learning in technical schools are out of reach. Likewise, the efficiency of the system
is not considered. By that we mean the quality of the education and the time
necessary to go through the system.
Inequality has been attracting increasing attention from scholars, both at the
theoretical and the historical level. While different attempts have been made to
connect income inequality and growth in Latin America from an institutionalist
point of view (Acemouglu, Johnson & Robinson 2001 and 2006 relying more on
wealth inequality and political power, and Engerman & Sokoloff 1997 and 2001,
relying more on resource endowments) and from a neo-classical point of view
(Jeffrey Williamson 1997, 1998, 1999, for example), not many connections have
been established between inequality and technical change. Bértola (2005) was an
attempt to empirically approach income inequality in Uruguay and other Southern
settler societies, but the connection to the discussion on convergence and divergence
regimes was still very timid. In Willebald (2007), an attempt is made to connect
recent theoretical links between growth, income distribution and innovation with
empirical research, with promising results. In a very broad sense, what may be
important to elucidate is to what extent inequality trends are the result of pure
market mechanisms or of different kinds of institutional arrangements.
Per capita GDP2
The per capita GDP index is shown in Appendix Table 1 (AP1). The general
trends of relative per capita GDP growth reproduced in Graph 1 are very well-
known. An interpretation may be found in Bértola & Porcile (2006).3 The basic
stylized facts are as follows:
- Argentina and Uruguay started the 20th Century at relatively high levels of per
capita income. Around 1910-1930, the trend changed and a long-lasting
divergence trend took place and deepened after the 1960s.
- Brazil, on the contrary, started at very low levels but showed recurrent catching-
up cycles until 1980, when a new divergent trend started. In spite of the
catching-up trend 1910-1980, Brazil remained a long distance from the core
countries, but almost caught up with its Latin American neighbours.
Graph 1. Per capita GDP of Arge nt ina, Braz il, Uruguay and four
core countr ie s 1900-2000 (4CC=100)
0
20
40
60
80
100
19
00
19
10
19
20
19
30
19
40
19
50
19
60
19
70
19
80
19
90
20
00
AR BR
UY 4CC
Argentina and Uruguay achieved high relative growth in 1870-1913, associated with
a dynamic integration into the golden era of classic liberalism on the basis of inter-
industry specialization in meat and temperate agricultural goods facing high income
elasticity of demand. Competitive advantages were classical, related to the relative
abundance of factors of production. Argentina not only converged but she also forged
ahead in relation to the European countries, following a path which, in its early phases,
resembled (with less intensity) the successful experience of the United States. Uruguay
achieved a short period of convergence on the basis of import substitution after World
War II. However, this regime of convergence was inevitably short-lived as the
international economy recovered and import-substitution imposed increasingly higher
costs. A change in the pattern of trade was therefore necessary to sustain convergence.
Brazil started a process of moderate convergence during a time during which
international trade collapsed because of major international crises (the Great
Depression, World Wars I and II). Modest convergence was achieved in the 1930s by
means of import-substituting industrialization. Brazil continued to converge moderately
by means of a structural convergence with the leaders, based on a process of catching-
2 This section is strongly based on Bértola & Porcile (2006).
3 For other recent contributions on convergence and divergence between Latin America and the rest and
within Latin America, see Edwards (2007) and Sanz (2007) in Revista de Historia Económica – Journal
of Iberian and Latin American Economic History,1/2007.
up in new metal-mechanical and chemical industries implanted in the late 1950s.
Structural transformation in the «developmentalist» period changed the growth trends of
Brazil and gave rise to incremental, cumulative industrial learning. Although the
domestic market remained as the principal outlet for industrial production, a slow but
continuous process of export diversification occurred. By then, international trade grew
at very high rates (1960-1973); later on (1973-78) international capital flows expanded,
compensating for the loss of dynamism of international trade.
Argentina and Uruguay were not able to move from the first type of convergence
regime to the second. Brazil had a wider gap to take advantage of, and adopted policies
for structural change in a much more vigorous way than Argentina and Uruguay and
this is part of the explanation for the relative success of Brazil until 1980. Argentina and
Uruguay suffered significantly from demand-side variables, related to changes in
patterns of demand and to institutional arrangements in the international economy
which brought an end to the classical liberal era of British hegemony, redefining the
rules of the game in international trade. Supply-side variables were related to path-
dependency and the failure of Argentina and Uruguay, and to a lesser extent Brazil, to
build up an institutional framework conductive to rapid structural change and rapidly
growing exports of manufactured goods. The experience of the decades following the
debt crisis suggest that, in all cases, policies aimed at structural change in the region
were too weak to secure long run catching-up.
Due to data availability, from now on we will only report inequality results for
Uruguay and the USA alone (Table 2). Income inequality in Uruguay and USA shows
a “U”-curve (note: not an inverse “U”-curve as in Kuznets; see Bértola 2005), with
bottom values in 1970. The increase in inequality does not seem to reach the figures of
the early 20th Century. The reduction in inequality 1910-1970 was probably more
important in the USA than in Uruguay. The increase in inequality had in Uruguay a
decisive turning point in relation to the military dictatorship which increased inequality
to levels that later democratic regimes could not revert.
Table 2. Gini-coefficients of the components of the HHDI, Uruguay and the USA, 1910-2000
Uruguay USA Uruguay USA Uruguay USA Uruguay USA
1910 0.472 0.490 0.305 0.291 0.154 0.055 0.323 0.301
1920 0.464 0.440 0.321 0.244 0.142 0.067 0.322 0.266
1930 0.465 0.390 0.287 0.199 0.126 0.096 0.307 0.239
1940 0.455 0.400 0.252 0.159 0.107 0.124 0.286 0.238
1950 0.438 0.360 0.187 0.125 0.096 0.142 0.255 0.217
1960 0.380 0.349 0.169 0.111 0.109 0.150 0.229 0.210
1970 0.363 0.341 0.167 0.108 0.118 0.166 0.224 0.211
1980 0.406 0.352 0.147 0.094 0.127 0.183 0.238 0.217
1990 0.416 0.378 0.125 0.089 0.147 0.197 0.242 0.231
2000 0.433 0.405 0.118 0.082 0.166 0.194 0.253 0.239
* The geometric average of the Gini is estimated as in equation (5): GAG i = 1- ((1-Gy i)*(1-Glife i)*(1-Gedu i))^(1/3).
Geometric av.*
Life expectancyIncome TotalEducation
The impact of inequality on per capita GDP growth is presented in Table 3. The
USA received a 20% improvement in the GDP levels due to the reduction of inequality
between 1910 and 1930, and a further 10% increase up to 1970. Afterwards, half of
these gains were lost as inequality increased. In the case of Uruguay the highest gain in
inequality reduction was obtained in 1970 (20%) and again half of these gains had been
lost by 2000.
The comparative position of Uruguay in relation to the USA is somewhat worse in
the case of the IAHGDP than in the case of the HGDP, due to in average higher
inequality figures.
Table 3. Per capita GDP Indices for Uruguay and the USA, 1910-2000 (1910=100)
UY USA UY USA UY USA HGDP IAHGDP
1910 100 100 100 100 100 100 62 65
1920 85 112 86 123 101 110 47 45
1930 138 126 140 150 101 120 69 60
1940 117 142 121 167 103 118 52 47
1950 150 195 160 244 107 125 48 42
1960 160 231 188 295 117 128 43 41
1970 167 307 202 397 121 129 34 33
1980 213 380 240 483 113 127 35 32
1990 210 475 232 579 111 122 28 26
2000 256 576 275 672 107 117 28 26
UY/USAHGDP IAHGDP IAHGDP/HGDP
Life expectancy
Between 1900 and 2000 life expectancy in the core countries increased from 46 to
78 years, on average. While Argentina and Uruguay had slightly lower values at the
beginning of the 20th Century, Brazil showed remarkably lower figures: 29. The life
expectancy index (HLifei) is in AT2.
As shown in Graph 2, Brazil caught significantly up until the 1970s, specially
during the 1950s and 60s. Argentina and Uruguay showed some fluctuations around a
similar relative level. After the 1980s, however, the three Latin American countries
started a clear divergent trend. By 2000, life expectancy in Argentina, Brazil and
Uruguay was 73, 68 and 75, respectively. The convex achievement function makes,
however, the differences with core countries appear to be even larger: Brazil, for
example, shows values 45% of those of the core countries.
Gra ph 2. Life expe ctancy in Arge ntina , Brazi l and Urugua y
in rela tion to the average of four core countries, 1900-2000
(4CC=100)
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It seems that relative life expectancy and per capita GDP performance show rather
similar trends. Life expectancy was originally high in land and resource abundant
Argentina and Uruguay. A large amount of immigrants took with them different kinds
of knowledge which were combined with easy and relatively cheap access to basic
foodstuffs. Even if inequality levels were higher than in Europe and the USA, real
wages were relatively high in relation to those of the core countries (between 60 and
70%) and the most important cost was that of housing, while foodstuffs were much
cheaper (Bértola, Camou & Porcile 1999). Thus, in terms of nutrition the living
standards were similar.
The strong rise in life expectancy took place in the 1940-1980 in Argentina, in
1950-1990 in Brazil and 1940-1960 in the more homogeneous Uruguay. In all cases, the
domestic efforts to develop social policies made it possible to learn how to handle risks
and to make use of innovations introduced in the core countries, such as the use of
antibiotics. The introduction of these innovations and the development of health
systems allowed the Southern countries to reduce mortality rates, specially infant
mortality, and to conditionally converge with core countries (Brazil) or maintain relative
positions (Argentina and Uruguay). However, in the long run, and as the most important
factor explaining the increase in life expectancy became the extension of the life of the
elderly, the Latin American countries diverged due to their technological and systemic
backwardness. Besides the changing demographic problems to be faced, political
changes and economic performance weakened the welfare state. The results were
noticed from the 1980s and onwards (Argentina and Uruguay) and from the 1990s
(Brazil). In Becker, et. al.’s words:
“Finally, mortality data by cause of death are disaggregated to
understand the determinants of the cross-country convergence in life
expectancy observed between 1965 and 1995. Changes in mortality due to
infectious, respiratory and digestive diseases, congenital and perinatal
conditions, and “ill-defined” conditions are the most important factors
producing the convergence in life expectancy, whereas changes in mortality
due to nervous system, senses organs, heart and circulatory diseases worked
against convergence. This evidence suggests that the large changes in
mortality observed in the developing world were due to the absorption of
previously available technology and knowledge, while developed countries
took advantage of recent advances on the frontier of medical technology.”
(Becker: 2003, p.27).
It looks like a plausible explanation of the divergent trend we find in the late 20th
Century. It has to be stressed that our convex achievement function shows a divergent
trend rather than stagnation of the Latin American countries’ HLife.
Inequality in life expectancy follows a similar declining trend with time and with
increasing life expectancy, as shown in Graph 3. For every period of time, age
inequality was lower in the USA, and for every period of time, the life expectancy index
(HLifei) of the USA was higher than in Uruguay. That means that the USA shows a
structural lower inequality than Uruguay, i.e., for a similar life expectancy, the
inequality levels of the USA are lower. In other words, when adjusted for inequality, the
gap in life expectancy between USA and Uruguay increases.
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The USA showed a drastic fall in age-inequality levels in 1910-1950; later on the
index diminished rather slowly. By contrast, the life expectancy index accelerated after
the 1950s, without any spectacular reduction of inequality.
In the case of Uruguay the pattern is somewhat different, as inequality and the life
expectancy index moved more smoothly, excepting for a sharp decline of GLife and a
sharp increase in HLife between 1940 and 1950.
It is possible to link the phase of drastic reduction of age inequality in the USA and
Uruguay to the phase in which life expectancy increased through the control of causes
mortality affecting younger population, while the control of those diseases affecting
mainly the elderly didn’t affect inequality so much.
The contribution of the reduction in inequality to the improvement of the HLife was
considerably higher in Uruguay than in the USA, as shown in Table 4. Especially
important was the weight of the reduction of inequality in Uruguay in 1930-1950.
However, the reduction of inequality was at least as important in the USA as in
Uruguay. The difference depends on the more important increase of life expectancy in
the USA than in Uruguay.
Table 4. Life expectancy Indices for Uruguay and the USA, 1910-2000 (1910=100)
UY USA UY USA UY USA Hlife IAHLife
1910 100 100 100 100 100 100 86 84
1920 102 121 110 134 108 111 77 69
1930 114 153 133 155 116 102 81 72
1940 132 167 177 206 134 123 82 72
1950 167 210 264 261 158 124 92 85
1960 230 256 305 295 133 115 94 87
1970 260 285 300 313 115 110 87 81
1980 255 302 341 386 134 128 79 75
1990 283 366 407 419 143 114 85 82
2000 329 395 467 509 142 129 81 77
UY/USAHLife IALife IAHLife/HLife
Education
We will report three different estimates using three different models of the education
index as presented earlier. The results are shown in Appendix Table 3. In Graphs 4a-d
we show the relative performance according to each model and Latin American country
(4a-c), as well as an average of the three (4d).
Model 1 (Graph 4a) uses the United Nations’ weights for literacy rates and school
enrolment. According to it, Argentina and Uruguay reached absolute convergence with
the core countries in 1990. A strong process of convergence took place between 1910
and 1950, when the 90% level was already attained. Brazil, by contrast, had a much
lower point of departure, and went through a strong catching-up process since the
1950s. By 2000 Brazil still is 20% below the core countries. This story is almost
unbelievable: it’s hard to believe that Argentina and Uruguay have similar levels of
education to the core countries without straining credulity. It’s also hard to believe that
Brazil is only 20% below the core countries. However, the result is not surprising when
literacy rates answers for 2/3 of total education.
Model 2 (Graph 4b) shows a somewhat different and more credible picture. As
literacy rates are neglected, the index is only based on school enrolment at different
levels. At first sight, it seems an error to neglect illiteracy. However, the index tries to
take into account everything that adds to education and the maximum level is that of the
total population with tertiary education. In fact, illiteracy is not neglected: it just appears
as people who don’t add to the index. The first important difference with Model 1 is that
absolute convergence vanishes in the case of Brazil and even Uruguay. Brazil ceases to
narrow the gap in the 1980s at a very low level. The spurt of the 1990s in Argentina and
Uruguay vanishes; we get instead an important increase in the 1980s, due mainly to the
increased population with tertiary education, which to a high extent can be related to
political democratization.
Model 3 (Graph 4c) shows a quite different picture. When the index is constructed
on the basis of secondary and tertiary education alone, Argentina and Uruguay remain at
an important distance from the core countries, even if the trend is positive since the
1940s. Brazil, on the contrary, shows a cyclical movement, with convergence up to the
1950s, divergence afterwards, and recovery in the 1990s, without reaching the levels of
1950. The highly unequal and elitist Brazilian society remains 70% below the core
countries.
Which of these indices is the good one? Which of them reflects reality in a better
way? Ideally, we would like to construct a linked index, which could allow for
structural change as average levels of education increase. Even if it could be possible to
construct such kind of index for every single country, it’s difficult to construct one sole
index for comparative purposes, as countries with different levels of development
should have, at the same time, different internal structures.
The UN index may adequately reflect education attainment at early stages of
development. However, in the second half of the century, as literacy rates approach the
100% level, this education basket seems badly suited to really reflect differences in
human development. Besides, there is no need to combine literacy and school enrolment
as if they were different things. If adequately used, school enrolment measures the level
of education of a society. Model 3 looks especially adequate for the last decades of the
20th Century, as it helps to understand how wide differences are with respect to higher
education.
Graph 4a. Education achievem ents of the three
Latin Am erican Countr ie s relative to the ave rage
of the four core countries , 1910-2000 (4CC=100).
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Graph 4b. Education achievem ents of the three Latin
Am erican Countr ies re lative to the ave rage of the
four core countrie s, 1910-2000 (4CC=100). M ode l 2.
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Graph 4c. Education achieve m ents of the three
Latin Am erican Countr ies relative to the
ave rage of the four core countr ies , 1910-2000
(4CC=100). Mode l 3.
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Graph 4d. Education achievem ents of the
ave rage of the three Latin Am erican Countr ie s
re lative to that of the four core countr ie s, 1910-
2000 (4CC=100)
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We think Model 2 is the best one to catch the education in the long-run and we will
use to construct our HHDI. The performance of the Latin American countries at the end
of the 20th Century will probably be over-estimated.
Inequality in the access to education increased steadily in the USA. However, the
original inequality levels were extremely low, given the fact that illiteracy was almost
non-existent but secondary and higher educational were not yet generalized. The final
inequality levels were still lower than those of the other components of the HDI and
reflect a permanent increase of the access of new groups to higher education. In
Uruguay, inequality in the access to education went through similar trends as income
inequality: a decreasing trend until 1950, and increasing inequality afterwards to similar
levels to those of the starting point. While the egalitarian trend may be interpreted as the
result of the strong reduction of illiteracy and the generalization of primary school
enrolment, the second trend may be seen as the result of the expansion of secondary and
tertiary education, so long limited to some groups of the population. This latter trend is
similar to the trend of the USA during the whole century. As shown in Table 5, the
impact of inequality trends on the IAHEdu is not as important in the other indices: the
result is a relatively better performance of Uruguay. Nevertheless, as it was stated
before, we have many doubts about this almost absolute convergence.
Table 5. Education Indices for Uruguay and the USA, 1910-2000 (1910=100)
UY USA UY USA UY USA HEdu IAHEdu
1910 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100 100 37 33
1920 120.3 112.5 122.1 111.1 101 99 40 37
1930 142.8 136.8 147.6 130.9 103 96 39 38
1940 177.4 152.8 187.3 141.7 106 93 43 44
1950 213.8 167.7 228.6 152.2 107 91 48 50
1960 289.0 181.1 304.5 162.9 105 90 60 62
1970 345.0 223.8 359.7 197.4 104 88 57 61
1980 335.3 238.8 346.2 206.5 103 86 52 56
1990 438.0 204.4 441.8 173.8 101 85 80 85
2000 489.2 202.2 482.8 172.5 99 85 90 93
HEdu IAHEdu IAHEdu/Hedu UY/USA
The Historical Human Development Index (HHDI)
Graph 5 shows the performance of Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay in terms of
Human Development and in relation to the four core countries. The index is constructed
using Model 2 for education and a geometric average of the components.
Argentina reproduces a well-known story: her performance was very successful in
the first decades of the 20th Century, converging with core countries; afterwards she
experienced a long-run divergence. The steep fall of per capita GDP was partly
counterbalanced by improvements in life expectancy (education remaining stable).
Divergence advanced slightly until the 1980s, when the well-known “lost decade” left
important scars. The relative improvement of education couldn’t match the negative
trend in GDP and life expectancy.
The Uruguayan case is very similar to the Argentine, but there exist some nuances:
starting from a lower level, its convergence with core countries advanced up to the
1950s, due to an acceptable GDP performance and improved life expectancy and
education figures. The divergent trend started with a steep fall in the 1960s, when GDP
stagnated and was followed by relatively falling life expectancy and stagnating
education figures. Since the 1980s only education could resist the downwards trend.
Brazil, on the contrary, started at very low levels catching steadily up, until 1980.
All variables contributed to that movement: education did it steadily, per capita GDP
with spurts in the 1940s and 1870s, and life expectancy especially in the 1950s. The lost
decade not only interrupted, but also changed the trend. Brazil not only started to
diverge from core countries, but it also lost ground in relation to its Southern
neighbours. Only in education was its performance acceptable.
Graph 5. Historical Human De ve lopment In dex:
Argentina , Brazil and Uruguay relat ive to four core
countrie s, 1900-2000 (4CC=100)
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If we think in terms of an input-output relation, in terms of how much life
expectancy and education were produced with help of the per capita GDP, i.e., what
kind of lives we produce with the income we have at our disposal, the Latin American
countries show an apparently better relation: best is Brazil and worst are the USA (see
Graph 6). An alternative way to think about it is giving technology transfers an
important role: technical change and GDP growth in the core countries are not able to
dramatically increase human development, but the transfer of knowledge, technology
and innovation to laggard countries have a higher impact there than what was possible
to achieve on the basis of domestic GDP growth. As it was earlier sustained, the
capacity of laggard countries to make an intelligent and effective use of the
technological gap directly depends on the domestic capabilities and efforts to develop
educational and wealth systems.
Gra ph 6. Ge ometric average of the life-expectancy
inde x and the education inde x rela tive to the pe r
capita GDP index, 1900-200.
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
2.00
2.50
1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
BR USA
FR-GER-UK AR-UY
Finally, we have to mention that our results diverge from those obtained by Astorga
& FitzGerald (1998), Astorga, Bergès & FitzGerald (2004), and Prados (2007). What
we obtain is a divergent trend in human development of Southern Cone countries,
which started early in the 20th Century in Argentina, in the middle of the century in
Uruguay and in the 1980s in Brazil. What our colleagues found was a process of
convergence in the central decades of the century and a relatively stable situation
afterwards.
The differences may partly arise from the different group of countries considered.
It’s well known that Argentina and Uruguay were among the most successful Latin
American countries during the first globalisation. The Brazilian timing (not the growth
rates) is more representative for the average of the Latin American countries. However,
the way in which our index is constructed surely explains a great part of the differences
found.
The Inequality-Adjusted Historical Human Development Index (IAHHDI) of
Uruguay and the USA
This section is devoted to the discussion of the impact of inequality on human
development. The basic idea is that human development is higher if equally distributed.
The procedure, according to equation (5), is to adjust human development by an
inequality index. The geometric inequality index was presented in Table 2. Inequality
levels in Uruguay and USA do not differ significantly (somewhat higher in Uruguay)
and show a similar trend: decreasing inequality between 1910 and the 1960s; increasing
inequality afterwards. Both the downwards and the upwards trends were slightly more
pronounced in Uruguay than in the USA. Thus, the way in which inequality will correct
human development is rather similar in both countries: increasing growth up to the
1960s and reducing it afterwards. This is a somewhat undesired result of this paper, as
the importance of the inequality adjustment should be more important if the two
countries showed different inequality levels and trends.
Appendix Table 5 summarizes the results. As the maximum level of the IAHHDI is
achieved when all the components of the HHDI reach the maximum values and all of
them are equally distributed (Gini=0), the levels of the index are significantly reduced.
The best record of the USA, for example, was 0.377, in 2000.
In order to avoid the differences in levels of the HGDP, the HHDI and the IAHHDP
we show the three in Graph 7a-b with a similar starting point in 1910. The graphs may
be read as an approach to different growth models, featured by different combinations
of the indices.
In the case of Uruguay it’s noticeable that the HGDP shows a clearly lower
performance than the other two. The HHDI grows much more, and even higher is the
growth performance if distribution is considered. It is also interesting to notice that the
gap widened in 1930-1960, when policies promoting education and wealth were
especially strong and when inequality diminished because of policy-making after the
1940s. The gap widened again in the 1980s, when the country moved to democracy
after a decade of dictatorship.
In the case of the USA, the picture is quite different. Both the HHDI and the
IAHHDI grew faster than the HGDP until 1940. By then, infant mortality was
eradicated and primary schooling generalized. Life expectancy and inequality decreased
significantly. The second part of the century was featured by very fast per capita GDP
growth with increasing inequality. HEdu was the weakest component of the HHDI of
the USA and helped to widen the gap with HGDP, together with the inequality trends.
Graph 7a. Per capita GDP, HHDI and IAHHDI of
Uruguay, 1910-2000 (1910=100)
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Graph 7b. Per capita GDP, HHDI and IAHHDI of
the USA 1910-2000 (1910=100)
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6. Conclusions
This paper presented a 20th Century Historical Human Development Index (HHDI)
for three Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay) and four core
countries (France, Germany, UK and USA), and an Inequality-Adjusted Historical
Human Development Index (IAHHDI) for Uruguay and the USA, based on the idea that
human development is higher if inequality is lower.
The HHDI has different features which, considered together, make it different from
previous attempts: the per capita GDP series were not log-transformed; life expectancy
adopted a convex achievement function with maximum and minimum values 80 and 20
years, respectively; the education series was estimated with data on school enrolment
alone, neglecting the use of literacy rates. A geometric average of the indices was
estimated.
The IAHHDI is based on available inequality series for income distribution and
own estimates of inequality series for education and life expectancy of Uruguay and the
USA.
The results were discussed and presented in comparative terms.
Relative per capita GDP growth is a well-known story. This paper doesn’t add to
Bértola & Porcile (2006) in that respect: Argentina and Uruguay show a divergent trend
since the early 20 th Century while Brazil converge up to 1980, diverging later on. When
adjusted for inequality USA’s per capita GDP was increased 20% between 1910 and
1930, and a further 10% increase up to 1970. Afterwards, half of these gains were lost
as inequality increased. In the case of Uruguay the increase added to 20% in 1970,
while half of it was lost by 2000.
In terms of life expectancy Brazil caught significantly up from very low levels until
the 1970s. Argentina and Uruguay showed some fluctuations around similar levels.
After the 1980s, however, the three Latin American countries started a clear divergent
trend to levels below 75% of the core countries. The strong rise in life expectancy
(1940-1980 in Argentina, 1950-1990 in Brazil, 1940-1960 Uruguay) were mainly due to
social investment which made possible to learn how to handle risks and to take
advantage from technological spill-overs from core countries and reduce mortality rates,
specially infant mortality. As further increases in life expectancy became more related
to the extension of the life of the elderly, and as social investment and economic growth
weakened from the 1970s and onwards, life expectancy was relatively reduced.
Inequality in life expectancy follows a similar declining trend with time and with
increasing life expectancy. The phase of drastic reduction of age inequality in the USA
and Uruguay is related to the phase in which life expectancy increased through the
control of mortality causes affecting younger population. By contrast, the control of
diseases affecting mainly the elderly didn’t affect inequality so much. When adjusted
for inequality, the gap in life expectancy between USA and Uruguay increases.
Our education index is more credible than the one used by the UN, as it takes into
account the contributions to the education of the population at different levels. The
results themselves look more reliable. Argentina shows a stable position relative to the
core countries in 1920-1980. During the 1980s some convergence is achieved due to
increasing population in secondary and tertiary education and to democratization. Brazil
caught up significantly in 1910-1980, but could not surpass the 60% level. Uruguay
caught up until 1960 and remained fluctuating around similar levels afterwards. We
suspect that the Latin American countries’ indices are over-valued at the end of the
period.
Inequality in the access to education started at very low levels and increased
steadily in the USA. In Uruguay, inequality in the access to education went through
similar trends as income inequality: a decreasing trend until 1950, and increasing
inequality afterwards to similar levels to those of the starting point.
When we finally geometrically combine the three components into the HHDI we
find that: Argentina started to diverge at early stages of the 20th Century, Uruguay
diverged from the mid-century, and Brazil continued to tighten the gap up to 1980.
They all diverged after the mentioned dates. Our results diverge from those obtained by
Astorga & FitzGerald (1998), Astorga, Bergès & FitzGerald (2004), and Prados (2007).
They all found convergence in the central decades of the century and a relatively stable
situation afterwards.
If we think in terms of an input-output relation between per capita GDP as input
and, on the other side, education and life expectancy as outputs, the Latin American
countries show an apparently better relation: best is Brazil and worst are the USA.
Alternatively, technical change and GDP growth in the core countries are not able to
dramatically increase human development at home, but technological spill-overs to
laggard countries have a higher impact there. Laggard countries potential to make an
intelligent and effective use of the technological gap directly depends on the domestic
capabilities and efforts to develop educational and wealth systems.
Total inequality in Uruguay and USA showed similar levels and trends: it
decreased until the 1950s, and increased afterwards to similar levels. While inequality
affects human development within both countries, it doesn’t help to understand the
differences between them, due to the mentioned similarity of the Gini-coefficients. In
both cases different models may be noticed. Up to the mid-century increasing inequality
made the IAHHDI to grow faster than the HHDI. The contrary is valid for the second
part of the century.
Bibliography
Acemoglu, D., S. Johnson, & J. Robinson (2001), “The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development:
An Empirical Investigation”. American Economic Review (December): 1369-401.
Acemoglu, D., S. Johnson, & J. Robinson (2006), “Institutions as the Fundamental Cause of Long-
Run Growth”, in Aghion, Ph. & S. Durlauf Handbook of Economic Growth.
Ahuja, V. & Filmer, D (1995), “Educational attainment in developing countries: new estimates and
projections disaggregated by gender”. Background Paper for the World Development Report 1995.
The World Bank, Washington DC.
Astorga, P. & V. FitzGerald. (1998), “The Standard of Living in Latin America During the Twentieth
Century” Development Studies Working Paper N. 117 , Queen Elizabeth House, St. Antony’s
College, University of Oxford (May).
Astorga, P., A.R. Bergés & V. FitzGerald. (2004): The Standard of Living in Latin America during the
Twentieth Century. University of Oxford Discussion Papers in Economic and Social History 54.
Becker, G., T. Philipson & R. Soares (2003), “The quantity and quality of life and the evolution of world
inequality”. National Bureau of Economic Research, June. Cambridge.
Bértola, L. & Bertoni, R. (1999), "Educación y Aprendizaje: su contribución a la definición de Escenarios
de Convergencia y Divergencia", Unidad Multidisciplinaria, Facultad de Ciencias Sociales,
Documento de Trabajo 46.
Bértola, L., M. Camou, & G. Porcile (1999): "Comparación Internacional del Poder Adquisitivo de los
Salarios Reales de los Países del Cono Sur, 1870-1945", Segundas Jornadas de Historia
Económica, Montevideo, Julio.
Bértola, L. (2000), Ensayos de Historia Económica: Uruguay en la región y el mundo. Montevideo,
Trilce 2000.
Bértola, L. (2005), "A 50 años de la Curva de Kuznets: Crecimiento y distribución del ingreso en
Uruguay y otras economías de nuevo asentamiento desde 1870", Investigaciones en Historia
Económica, 3/2005, pp. 135-176 (España).
Bértola, L. & Porcile G. (2006), “Convergence, Trade and Industrial Policy: Argentina, Brazil and
Uruguay in the International Economy, 1900-1980”, Revista de Historia Económica. Journal of
Iberian and Latin American Economic History, 1/2006, 37-67.
Camou, M.& S. Maubrigades (2005), “La calidad de vida bajo la lupa: 100 años de evolución de los
principales indicadores” in Boletín de Historia Económica , No.4.
Edwards Sebastián (2007) “Crises and Growth: A Latin American Perspective”, Revista de Historia
Económica – Journal of Iberian and Latin American Economic History, 1/2007.
Engerman S. & K. Sokoloff (1997) "Factor Endowments, Institutions and Differential Paths of
Growth. A view from economic historians from the United States" in S. Haber How Latin
America Fell Behind: essays on the economic histories of Brazil and Mexico, 1800-1914 (Stanford).
Engerman S. & K. Sokoloff (2001), “The Evolution of Suffrage in the New World: A
Preliminary Examination” Paper presented to the 2001 Cliometrics Conference, Tucson,
Arizona (May 18-20).
Goldin, C. (1998), "America's Graduation High School: the Evolution and Spread of Secondary
Schooling in the Twentieth Century" The Journal of Economic History, vol 58, Nº 2, June.
Hicks, D. A., (1997), “The Inequality-Adjusted Human Development Index : A Constructive Proposal”,
World Development, Vol. 25, Nº. 8, pp. 1283-1298.
Maddison, Angus (1995): L’economie mondiale 1820-1992. Centre de développement de l’organisation et
de développement économiques. OCDE.
Migliónico, A (2001), República oriental del Uruguay. Tablas Abreviadas de Mortalidad por Sexo y
Edad, 1908-1999. Ministerio de Salud Pública.
Offer, A. 2000. “Economic Welfare Measurements and Human Well-Being”, Discussion Papers in
Economic and Social History No. 34. URL:
http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/Economics/History/Paper34/offer34.pdf.
Offer, A. (1996): “Introduction” en: Offer, Avner (Ed.). In Pursuit of the Quality of Life. Oxford
University Press, New York, 1996, p. 1.
Prados de la Escosura, L. (2004): When did America Fall Behind? Evidence from Long-run International
Inequality. Presented at the Inter-American Seminar on Economics 2004. NBER December,
México.
Prados de la Escosura, L. (2006): “Long-Run International Differences in Real Income and Human
Development: Evidence from Europe and the New World”. Paper to be presented at Session 41,
“International Differences in Economic Welfare: A Long-Run Perspective”, International
Economic History Association Congress, Helsinki August 20-26.
Prados de la Escosura, L. (2007), “Improving the Human Development Index: A New Data Set for the
Western World, 1850-2000” (mimeo).
Sanz, I. (2007) “Human Capital and Convergence in Latin-America: 1950-2000”, Revista de Historia
Económica – Journal of Iberian and Latin American Economic History,1/2007.
Sen, A. (1993): “Capacidad y bienestar” en: Nussebaum, Martha C. & Sen, Amartya compiladores La
calidad de vida. The United Nations University. Fondo de Cultura Económica, México.
Shkolnikov, V. M., E. E. Andreev & A. Z. Begun (2003), “Gini coefficient as a life table function:
computation from discrete data, decomposition of differences and empirical examples”
Demographic Research, 8/2003, pp. 305-358, Max-Planck-Gesellschaft.
Thorp, R. 1998. Progress, Poverty, and Exclusion: An Economic History of Latin America in the 20th
Century. Baltimore, Inter-American Development Bank.
UNDP (1990-2006), Human Development Report .
United Nations University WIDER (2007), World Income Inequality Database V 2.0b. May 2007,
http://www.wider.unu.edu/wiid/wiid.htm.
Verspagen, B. (1993): Uneven Growth between Interdependent Economies. A Evolutionary View on
Technology Gaps, Trade and Growth. Aldershot: Avebury.
Willebald H. (2007), “Distribution, Specialization and Economic Performance in Settler Societies, 1870-
2000”. 1er Congreso Latinoamericano de Historia Económica y 4as Jornadas Uruguayas de
Historia Económica, Montevideo, Uruguay.
Williamson, J. G. (1997), “Globalization and Inequality, Past and Present” World Bank Research
Observer 12 (April): 117-35.
Williamson, J. G. (1998), “Growth, Distribution and Demography: Some Lessons from History”
Explorations in Economic History 35 (July): 241-71.
Williamson, J. G. (1999), “Real Wages, Inequality, and Globalization in Latin America before 1940”,
Revista de Historia Economica, 17, special number: 101-42.
Appendix Table 1. Per Capita GDP Index, Hy i1900-2000.
AR BR UY FR GER UK USA
1900 0.067 0.014 0.053 0.070 0.072 0.110 0.100
1910 0.093 0.017 0.076 0.072 0.081 0.113 0.122
1920 0.085 0.022 0.065 0.078 0.068 0.111 0.137
1930 0.100 0.024 0.105 0.111 0.097 0.134 0.153
1940 0.102 0.029 0.089 0.099 0.133 0.169 0.173
1950 0.122 0.039 0.114 0.130 0.095 0.171 0.237
1960 0.137 0.056 0.122 0.187 0.191 0.214 0.281
1970 0.181 0.074 0.127 0.290 0.269 0.267 0.374
1980 0.203 0.128 0.162 0.376 0.351 0.322 0.463
1990 0.159 0.121 0.160 0.451 0.397 0.409 0.579
2000 0.212 0.137 0.194 0.519 0.464 0.494 0.702
Hy i=(y i-100)/(40000-100)
Appendix Table 2. Life-expectancy Index, Hlife i , 1900-2000
AR BR UY FR GER UK USA
1900 0.093 0.040 0.157 0.132 0.142 0.141 0.154
1910 0.125 0.049 0.160 0.181 0.190 0.204 0.186
1920 0.161 0.055 0.180 0.183 0.216 0.230 0.234
1930 0.195 0.065 0.208 0.233 0.258 0.286 0.256
1940 0.224 0.081 0.263 0.165 0.255 0.276 0.323
1950 0.281 0.118 0.361 0.364 0.392 0.419 0.393
1960 0.339 0.214 0.409 0.463 0.453 0.458 0.438
1970 0.374 0.256 0.401 0.505 0.487 0.492 0.463
1980 0.438 0.308 0.446 0.593 0.572 0.562 0.562
1990 0.492 0.355 0.518 0.776 0.690 0.687 0.607
2000 0.525 0.393 0.590 1.000 0.863 0.856 0.732
Function: Hlife i=(log(80-20)-(log80- life i))/log(80-20)
Appendix Table 3. Education Index, Hedu i, 1900-2000
MODEL 1. Literacy Enrolment (enr)Primary (p) Secondary (s) Tertiary (t)
weights a b
0.67 0.33
coefficients e p s t
4.4 1 1.4 2
ARGENTINA BRAZIL URUGUAY FRANCE GERMANY UK USA
1900 0.35 0.24 0.35 0.59 0.67 0.65 0.63
1910 0.42 0.24 0.41 0.62 0.68 0.65 0.65
1920 0.48 0.24 0.47 0.63 0.68 0.67 0.67
1930 0.52 0.28 0.52 0.66 0.69 0.68 0.69
1940 0.58 0.31 0.57 0.68 0.70 0.69 0.70
1950 0.62 0.35 0.62 0.69 0.70 0.71 0.71
1960 0.65 0.43 0.64 0.71 0.70 0.71 0.72
1970 0.67 0.49 0.67 0.72 0.71 0.72 0.75
1980 0.68 0.55 0.68 0.72 0.72 0.73 0.76
1990 0.71 0.58 0.71 0.73 0.73 0.72 0.75
2000 0.73 0.62 0.72 0.74 0.76 0.74 0.74
MODEL 2. Literacy Enrolment Primary Secondary Tertiary
weights a b
0.00 1.00
coefficients e p s t
4.4 1 1.4 2
ARGENTINA BRAZIL URUGUAY FRANCE GERMANY UK USA
1900 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.10 0.09 0.11 0.11
1910 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.12
1920 0.07 0.02 0.05 0.07 0.10 0.10 0.13
1930 0.07 0.03 0.06 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.16
1940 0.09 0.04 0.08 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.18
1950 0.10 0.06 0.09 0.12 0.12 0.15 0.20
1960 0.12 0.08 0.13 0.15 0.11 0.18 0.21
1970 0.14 0.10 0.15 0.17 0.16 0.19 0.26
1980 0.15 0.12 0.15 0.17 0.17 0.21 0.28
1990 0.20 0.13 0.19 0.21 0.21 0.18 0.24
2000 0.24 0.17 0.21 0.25 0.31 0.25 0.24
MODEL 3 Literacy Enrolment Primary Secondary Tertiary
weights a b
0 1
coefficients e p s t
2.4 0 1 1.4
ARGENTINA BRAZIL URUGUAY FRANCE GERMANY UK USA
1900 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1910 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02
1920 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.03
1930 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.06
1940 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.10
1950 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.10 0.12
1960 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.14 0.13
1970 0.07 0.03 0.09 0.13 0.09 0.14 0.22
1980 0.08 0.04 0.09 0.14 0.14 0.18 0.25
1990 0.13 0.04 0.15 0.20 0.22 0.16 0.22
2000 0.20 0.07 0.18 0.24 0.34 0.23 0.22
Function: Hedu i= lit i*a+((p i * p +s i * s +t i* t )/ e )*b
Appendix Table 4. The Geomteric Historical Human Development Indexes, 1900-2000
AR BR UY FR GER UK USA
Model G1
1900 0.086 0.032 0.094 0.122 0.128 0.150 0.149
1910 0.114 0.037 0.112 0.139 0.150 0.168 0.172
1920 0.127 0.042 0.116 0.138 0.147 0.175 0.197
1930 0.147 0.050 0.150 0.176 0.176 0.201 0.218
1940 0.161 0.061 0.160 0.153 0.196 0.218 0.251
1950 0.191 0.082 0.201 0.223 0.206 0.267 0.303
1960 0.218 0.121 0.225 0.283 0.271 0.305 0.338
1970 0.254 0.151 0.235 0.343 0.327 0.339 0.396
1980 0.284 0.202 0.263 0.397 0.383 0.383 0.460
1990 0.285 0.212 0.290 0.480 0.441 0.433 0.492
2000 0.335 0.240 0.331 0.563 0.543 0.526 0.557
Model G2
1900 0.064 0.020 0.068 0.096 0.098 0.119 0.119
1910 0.086 0.025 0.081 0.111 0.117 0.130 0.139
1920 0.099 0.029 0.085 0.100 0.114 0.135 0.162
1930 0.113 0.036 0.111 0.137 0.136 0.155 0.185
1940 0.126 0.047 0.122 0.121 0.153 0.171 0.216
1950 0.150 0.066 0.157 0.180 0.165 0.223 0.264
1960 0.176 0.098 0.185 0.236 0.215 0.263 0.297
1970 0.212 0.126 0.198 0.290 0.274 0.292 0.357
1980 0.240 0.170 0.220 0.338 0.326 0.335 0.418
1990 0.248 0.179 0.251 0.422 0.386 0.372 0.438
2000 0.300 0.208 0.291 0.504 0.500 0.470 0.496
Model G3
1900 0.017 0.000 0.016 0.023 0.023 0.026 0.041
1910 0.037 0.014 0.035 0.043 0.065 0.053 0.073
1920 0.043 0.015 0.044 0.048 0.070 0.070 0.103
1930 0.054 0.019 0.059 0.076 0.088 0.088 0.136
1940 0.066 0.028 0.075 0.072 0.098 0.114 0.179
1950 0.095 0.050 0.111 0.131 0.112 0.193 0.225
1960 0.122 0.074 0.139 0.185 0.165 0.240 0.249
1970 0.164 0.082 0.165 0.263 0.231 0.266 0.335
1980 0.192 0.114 0.187 0.313 0.306 0.321 0.402
1990 0.215 0.117 0.231 0.414 0.392 0.359 0.426
2000 0.283 0.156 0.272 0.502 0.517 0.458 0.480
Source: Tables AT1, AT2 and AT3.
Appendix Table 5. The Inequalit-Adjusted Historical Human Development Index of Uruguay and USA, 1910-2000
UY USA UY/USA
HGDP HHDI AIHHDI HGDP HHDI AIHHDI HGDP HHDI AIHHDI
1910 0.076 0.081 0.055 0.122 0.139 0.097 62.4 58.5 56.6
1920 0.065 0.085 0.058 0.137 0.162 0.119 47.2 52.5 48.5
1930 0.105 0.111 0.077 0.153 0.185 0.141 68.7 60.1 54.7
1940 0.089 0.122 0.087 0.173 0.216 0.164 51.5 56.7 53.1
1950 0.114 0.157 0.117 0.237 0.264 0.206 48.2 59.5 56.6
1960 0.122 0.185 0.142 0.281 0.297 0.234 43.3 62.2 60.8
1970 0.127 0.198 0.153 0.374 0.357 0.282 34.1 55.4 54.5
1980 0.162 0.220 0.167 0.463 0.418 0.327 35.1 52.6 51.2
1990 0.160 0.251 0.190 0.579 0.438 0.337 27.6 57.3 56.5
2000 0.194 0.291 0.217 0.702 0.496 0.377 27.7 58.6 57.6
Source: Tables 2, AT1, AT2 and AT3.USA
